Bayern würde eine sichere Ost-und Südgrenze erhalten (gegen Österreich
In the latter case, this movement would not be of great importance since the line of operations is interrupted by the fortress of Metz, and the same object might be attained by way of Mayence. This tract of country is of the greatest importance to the Power who shall first be able to possess itself of it, -such possession being, in fact, almost equivalent to the most successful campaign. -This position is the only one, upon which Austria can depend for the defence of her frontiers, and if she is forestalled in the occupation of it by a foreign force, no other (defence) presents itself, but in the centre of her hereditary States, in Bohemia. -It is, therefore, evident, that the Power in whose territory is ranked this country, must have a formidable weight in favour of the belligerent on whose side she declares herself; and by possessing the most advantageous line of transport would not fail to obtain a decisive influence. -Bavaria would find herself precisely in this situation if by succeeding in her endeavours to obtain possession of the Palatinate, she should be enabled to unite her dominions to her transrhenane province. -On the East, the important fortress of Passau puts her in possession of the principal route to Vienna, whilst on the West, she might receive a French army coming from Metz, and conducting it on her side of the Rhine, convert that river which now forms a protection to Germany, into a »point d'appui« for the enemy; and would thus put her in possession of the key to the South of Germany. -Once arrived there, Bavaria would offer to France a double line of points equally adapted to defence or advance. -These points are, on the first line, Hof, Bayreuth, Amberg, Ratisbone, Landshut and Munich. -On the second line, those of Regnitz, Lech, Bamberg, Forcheim, Nuremberg, Donauwörth, Augsbourg and Landsberg 90 , and thus, whilst the left wing would be in a state to resist any offensive movement from Bohemia, the right would afford every means of success which can be derived from a position so completely adapted to the purposes of war. -Considerations relative to Prussia! To appreciate the influence of Bavaria in respect to Prussia, it will be necessary to cast an eye over the geographical outlines of the latter Kingdom. -The great maps of states belonging to Prussia stretching from Stralsund to Memel, and from Erfurt to Cracow, is considerably advanced towards the South-West, and Erfurt forms a jutting angle which falls exactly in a line drawn from Mannheim to Berlin. -Now it is generally allowed, that jutting angles are the weakest points, and this, in addition, is interrupted in its junction, py parcels of foreign territories; but, on the other hand, it is protected by the province of Prussia situated upon the Rhine. It is this province which forms the principal means of defence to the Middle and North of Germany. -The Rhine bathes without interruption the Prussian territory from Bingen to Cleves, and this territory is protected by fortresses of the first rank -Coblentz itself sufficient to stop the progress of an enemy's army, Cologne and Wesel with Dusseldorff, and the numerous communications with both banks of the Rhine, offer on the low Rhine positions as advantageous as The first attempt of the French, in an invasion of Germany, would, therefore, be directed against these two points, -by so doing, they not only advance into the first protecting line, but in continuing along that of the Main, they effect the separation of Northern and Southern Ger- 
